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The Sucker Norm 
It sucks to be a sucker. In order for one person to be a sucker, someone else must behave 
badly: suckers are the victims of cheaters, scoundrels, and other selfish agents. Nonetheless, as a 
victim, a sucker gets as much scorn as pity. This is partly because suckers are somewhat to 
blame, inasmuch as they were naïve or stupid enough to agree to a bad deal. Therefore, feeling 
suckered is unusually aversive, compounding a material loss with blame from oneself and others. 
In this paper, I will review the theoretical and empirical scholarship bearing on the notion 
of being a sucker. I will ultimately suggest that there is a social norm against being a sucker, and 
that a number of experimental results could be reconsidered in light of this “sucker norm.” First, 
I establish, at least for the purposes of this analysis, the basic parameters of what it means to be a 
sucker. Second, I consider when the fear of being a sucker is helpful or normative, and when it 
seems to be misapplied to cases in which it might actually lead to sub-optimal outcomes. I 
suggest that the fear of being a sucker is especially potent because it defies a social norm. Third, 
I review research on situations in which people might try (and succeed) to avoid invoking the 
sucker norm so that they can accept a disadvantageously inequitable allocation when there is no 
chance for a higher payoff. I discuss how certain forms of retaliation and punishment might be 
explained as ways to alleviate the uncomfortable feeling of being a sucker. Finally, I offer some 
preliminary data on the effect of the sucker norm on behavior in an experimental game, and 
consider the possible implications of these results and directions for future research. 
I. What Does it Mean to be a Sucker?
a. Unfair, Disadvantageous Inequity
In order to be a sucker, a person must receive a disadvantageously inequitable payoff, 
meaning that he must either give more than he gets or get less than he deserves. Not only must 
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the distribution be unfavorable, but it must also be (or be perceived as) unjust. A person who 
plays the lottery and does not win does not feel like a sucker; he has received less than the 
winner, but they each took the same gamble and pure chance favored one of them. A person who 
finds that he has bought a fake lottery ticket, one that cannot win, does feel like a sucker; he is 
now down the cost of the ticket while the seller, who has no superior claim to the money, has 
made a profit. 
Though it is intuitively obvious that people are attuned to the fairness of any given 
distribution of resources, it is not always as clear how to predict whether people will judge an 
outcome to be fair. Fehr and Schmidt (2001) reviewed evidence from experimental economics 
research and identified two dominant theories of fairness. The first is the theory that people have 
preferences for social distribution, and that people prefer to see equitable distributions. Equity 
theory (Walster, Berscheid & Walster, 1973) posits that people have a taste for equity, such that 
the utility of an inequitable reward (either advantageous or disadvantageous) is less than the total 
amount of the reward, because people find the inequity itself aversive. Inequity aversion 
naturally produces different results depending on whether the inequity is advantageous or 
disadvantageous; those who are favored by an unequal distribution are more likely to be 
altruistic, while those who are not are more likely to be envious, and perhaps even spiteful 
(Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Schmidt, 2001). For the purposes of this paper, I am concerned with 
aversive responses to disadvantageous inequity; and I will argue that a necessary condition for 
being (or fearing becoming) a sucker is the perception of getting the short end of the stick. In 
order for one person to be a sucker, someone else must be getting more. 
As Fehr and Schmidt point out, though, the disadvantageous inequity alone is not enough 
to make a situation unfair, or unfair enough to instantiate aversive reactions. Thus, their review 
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also includes models of "intention-based reciprocity." In these models, actors are not just 
concerned with the distribution of resources; they are also concerned with the intentions of the 
agent who decided on the distribution. This is true for suckers, too: in order to fear being a 
sucker, I must be worried that someone else is going to exploit the situation or try to free-ride. 
Blount (1995) presented subjects with different versions of an ultimatum game in which they 
might find themselves in the responder role. They were asked to indicate the minimum 
acceptable offer in a game in which the offer was determined randomly by a computer and in a 
game in which the offer amount was determined by the proposer. In the random condition, 
subjects behaved almost in a classic wealth-maximizing way; most indicated that they would 
accept any distribution. When it was the proposer who determined the offer, though, the 
responders were much more likely to indicate that they would not accept much less than an even 
split. Falk, Fehr & Fishbacher (2000) have also shown that intentions matter. They used a variant 
on a trust game, in which the first player's move was determined either by the player or by a 
randomizing device. Both sanctions and rewards were much weaker in the non-intentionality 
condition than in the intentionality condition.  
Falk, Fehr & Fishbacher (2003) offer another interesting example to make this point. In 
an ultimatum game in which the proposer can choose between an (8,2) or a (5,5) distribution, 
most (8,2) offers are rejected. However, if the proposer's choices are only (8,2) and (2,8), the 
(8,2) offer is accepted more often. In the second game, there is no obvious fair or equitable 
solution. The proposer's choice to keep the money for himself is perhaps not preferred, but 
communicates little or nothing to the responder about his intentions to exploit the game for his 
own benefit. The responder cannot base his decision on relevant norms of fairness, because they 
do not apply to either of the available options. If the proposer does not perceive the payoff as 
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unfair, he will not feel like a sucker for consenting to the unequal distribution. 
 b. Consent, Trust, and Betrayal 
 "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me," goes one old adage about 
being a sucker. This admonition would be nonsensical for a victim of a random crime, or even 
the recipient of a stingy payoff in a dictator game. These victims have been treated unfairly, yes, 
but they have not, arguably, “played the sucker” (Orbell & Dawes, 1981); the phrase itself 
implies some kind of participation, action, or consent on the part of the sucker. In order to be a 
sucker, the victim must have evinced some kind of trust for his eventual antagonist, and then had 
that trust betrayed. 
 Being a sucker implies that one is exploited by others. But in what sense is someone 
exploited? One dominant theme in this literature is the idea that the sucker is a kind of naive 
cooperator. The sucker plays nicely while others take advantage. The most potent example of 
this dynamic comes from literature on trust and betrayal. In the archetypal example of the con 
artist and the sucker, the con artist works to win the sucker's trust. The sucker then parts with his 
money voluntarily. (“Voluntarily” in the immediate sense; participation under false pretenses is 
arguably non-consensual.) The sucker behaves prosocially and permits antisocial actors to profit 
from his naive cooperation. Cass Sunstein (2005) has described a phenomenon he calls the 
"betrayal heuristic." People seem to respond more negatively, and more punitively, to harms 
caused by a trusted agent than identical harms not caused by a trusted agent.  
 Experimental evidence suggests that people fear the consequences of misplaced trust, 
even more than they fear the consequences of other risks with equivalent expected values. 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) conducted an experiment in which players had to decide between 
two options: a medium reward for sure (S); or a gamble yielding either a very good (G) or very 
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bad payoff (B). The job of the decision-maker is to decide on a minimum acceptable probability 
of getting G such that he would prefer to take the gamble over the sure thing. In this game, there 
is also a recipient. If the decision-maker receives the sure-thing, the recipient also receives S. If 
the decision-maker chooses to take the gamble, the recipient gets one of two payoffs, both of 
which are higher than the sure-thing reward. The recipient's payoff is higher, though, if the 
decision-maker gets B and lower if the decision-maker gets G.  
 Bohnet and Zeckhauser ran two versions of this game. In one, the recipient was entirely 
passive, and, once the decision-maker established a minimum probability of success required to 
accept the gamble, the outcomes of both players were determined with reference to the actual 
probability of the higher payoff, which was established by lottery. In the other condition, the 
trust condition, the recipient was not passive. If the decision-maker chose to take the gamble, the 
recipient (whose incentives were inverse to the decision-maker's) then chose the outcome. In the 
trust condition, players were told that the probability of success for the gamble would be 
established by the proportion of recipients in a given round who indicated that they would 
choose G if the decision-maker took the gamble. Subjects required about a 30% probability of 
high payoffs in the passive recipient version; in the trust version, though, they required a 
probability of over 50% that their trust would be rewarded in order to take the gamble. 
 The researchers conclude from these results that the payoff in the trust version is 
discounted by a betrayal. Another way to frame this result is to think of the trusting decision-
maker as a potential sucker, who discounts the expected utility of the gamble by the risk of being 
exploited. When the recipient is passive, there is no fear of exploitation, and thus no additional 
loss of utility if the decision-maker takes the gamble and loses. This experiment suggests two 
more elements required for being a sucker. First, people behave differently when a human agent 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1162313
is going to be responsible for the distribution. Second, they are less willing to consent to take a 
risk on a human agent than they are when the risk is equivalent but there is no other agent.   
 c. Aversive Emotional Response to Being Suckered 
 Each sucker has to some extent contributed to his own state. The sucker who believes a 
slick salesman, only to read the fine print later, has literally bought into his own downfall. In a 
social dilemma, you cannot be a sucker without cooperating first. In each case, it is possible to 
avoid being a sucker. For this reason, the emotional experience of being a sucker is especially 
aversive, because it involves self-blame. Vohs, Baumeister and Chin (2007) have very recently 
tried to review the emotional and motivational aspects of feeling duped. They conclude that 
feeling suckered is a highly self-conscious emotion, like embarrassment or shame. In some 
sense, each sucker takes a risk of being duped or shortchanged when he trusts or cooperates. 
When he is ultimately suckered, his aversive response is not only anger at the perpetrator, but 
also a feeling of humiliation for having engaged in this relationship or transaction in the first 
place. Thus, one hallmark of being a sucker is a feeling of humiliation or shame. 
 Another important emotional dimension of being duped is the feeling of regret. Vohs, 
Baumeister and Chin (2007) note that part of being a sucker is wishing that things would have 
turned out differently. This certainly seems true, but I would add that the feeling of regret in this 
case is particularly acute because of the availability of the counterfactual scenario. Norm theory 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Miller and McFarland, 1986) suggests that people have stronger 
cognitive and affective responses to negative outcomes when the counterfactual scenario is easy 
to call to mind. One explanation for the mechanism driving this increased response is the 
availability bias; if I miss my plane by five minutes, it is simply easier to call up all of the ways 
in which I might have saved five minutes and made it there on time than it would be if I missed 
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my plane by an hour. In the case of being suckered, the sucker's own participation in his duping 
is very salient and therefore very available--even if there is no objective reason to think that he 
could have or should have known not to trust or not to cooperate ex ante. If regret is an important 
part of feeling duped, then it also seems safe to assume that the anticipation of this feeling will 
have a strong motivational effect.  
 d. Fear of Exploitation as Motivation 
 This review deals with three somewhat distinct psychological states: the fear of being a 
sucker, the experience of being a sucker, and the behavioral responses to feeling like a sucker. So 
far, I have been referring to these interchangeably, but it may be useful here to explicitly review 
the case that people fear playing the sucker.  
 In many social situations, non-cooperation can be explained by two possible motives: 
greed and fear. When people are greedy, they decide not to cooperate (to defect) because they 
hope to get the benefit of the group effort without paying the price of individual contribution. In 
order for greed to be a motivating factor, people must believe that others will not be greedy; that 
is, they must think that others will cooperate or contribute. In this paper, I am concerned 
primarily with how people behave when they expect the opposite, that others are greedy and will 
try to free-ride. Orbell and Dawes (1981) proposed that people find it aversive to play the sucker, 
enough so that the fear of others free-riding on one's own contributions may result in reduced 
contributions. When people believe that others will fail to cooperate, they can be motivated by 
the fear of being a sucker, and it is this fear of defection that in turn causes their own defection. 
Multiple studies comparing the relative strength of the greed and fear motivations in social 
dilemmas have found a stronger role for greed than for fear of playing the sucker (Dawes, Orbell, 
Simmons & van de Kragt, 1986; Rapaport & Eshed-Levy, 1989). Nonetheless, studies have 
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found that fear of being a sucker plays a significant role in social dilemmas (Rapaport & Eshed-
Levy, 1989; Bruins, Liebrand & Wilke, 1989), and this fear may be even clearer in cases like the 
ultimatum game, in which greed and fear would arguably lead to divergent behaviors. 
 Depending on the structure of the dilemma, the fear of exploitation will result in different 
types of responses, from a game theoretic perspective. The dominant response in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is to defect, since that response is better no matter what the other party is doing. Fear of 
being a sucker will reinforce this response. The normative response in an Ultimatum Game, 
though, is to accept any offer. Fear of being a sucker dictates against this response, though, so 
those who fear being a sucker will play out of equilibrium. For the purposes of this initial review, 
I will mainly address the psychological similarities among different forms of social dilemmas, 
with a focus on the effect of unequal outcomes among different participants in a given situation 
or game. 
II. Why Is It So Aversive To Be A Sucker? 
         a. Regret and Learning    
 The experience of being a sucker is aversive; in fact, it is so aversive that people will exert 
a lot of effort to avoid being a sucker or to alleviate the pain of exploitation. But what, exactly, is 
so unpleasant about being a sucker? Why does it feel worse to accept an unfair outcome that 
provides a small payoff than it does to avoid the situation and get no payoff at all? As a first 
pass, we should ask what function the humiliation of being a sucker might serve. At least one 
explanation is that it is adaptive to feel bad after being exploited or victimized or treated unfairly: 
these are situations that one should avoid in the future, and the aversive response can help 
instantiate learning. In this way, the unpleasant feeling of regret may simply be a mechanism to 
facilitate learning. This is particularly true when being a sucker is associated with a lack of 
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sophistication, or a kind of stupidity or short-sightedness, on the part of the sucker. Thus, in an 
extreme case, if I am tricked into buying beachfront property in Omaha, it makes sense for me to 
feel stupid and embarrassed. I should learn to be less trusting and more discerning in my 
business deals. This is true even in a more ambiguous case like a social dilemma game. People 
may consider their contribution to be a kind of investment in the group enterprise. If I contribute 
in early rounds and see that my “investment” has not paid off because others have not 
contributed, I should stop contributing. If I feel like a sucker for having been cooperative when 
others were selfish, I might learn this lesson more quickly and thus increase my total payoff. 
            It seems clear that there are many cases in which there are justifications for feeling bad in 
response to being ripped off. However, I also note that this itself can be a heuristic that leads to 
counterproductive results in certain circumstances. Thaler (1985) identified the phenomenon of 
reference price effects. In a series of experiments, he showed that subjects were willing to pay 
more for identical goods when they expected them to cost more (e.g., a beer from a bodega vs. a 
beer from a resort hotel), even if all other considerations (e.g., need for the good, quality of the 
good) were held constant. The general rule is that a sucker pays too much for a good. But if the 
good is only available from one vendor at a price that is otherwise worth it, the person who tries 
to avoid being a sucker winds up having to forgo the good altogether because they ask 
themselves what the price "should" be. In this case, there is no clear learning benefit to the 
sucker aversion, and it may in fact lead people to sub-optimal outcomes. 
 b. The Norm of Self-Interest 
 I have posited above that one of the principal emotions associated with being a sucker is 
humiliation. But why should it feel so bad to get $2 out of a possible $10 in an ultimatum game? 
Why is it less painful to be a lazy member of a failed group than the only hard-working member 
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of a more successful group? Here, I want to argue that the reason that it is embarrassing to be a 
sucker is that being a sucker violates a social norm of self-interest. Miller (1999) has argued that 
self-interest is not only a powerful motive in the descriptive sense, but that it is actually a 
prescriptive social norm: “The fear that deviating from one's material self-interest will provoke 
dismay, suspicion, or derogation can be as powerful a deterrent as the fear that it will prove futile 
or render one vulnerable to economic exploitation.” Miller cites interesting examples of how this 
norm functions. For example, Americans appear to be more comfortable describing pro-social 
behavior in terms of selfish motives, even when the behavior looks entirely altruistic (Holmes, 
Miller & Lerner, 2002). Ratner and Miller (2001) have argued that the norm of self-interest helps 
to explain experimental results showing that decisions made by groups are more self-interested 
than decisions made by individuals. One of the important components of self-interest as a social 
norm is that it changes peoples' expectations. As long as I think that everyone else is going to 
behave in a self-interested way, it is then doubly bad for me to behave altruistically; it is counter 
to the social norm and it is counter to my own material well-being (since if I know others will 
not cooperate, my own cooperation is futile). 
 I want to suggest that part of the norm of self-interest is a norm against being a sucker. A 
sucker’s behavior goes against the norm of self-interest insofar as the sucker behaves prosocially 
himself (e.g., by cooperating) and acts as though others will also follow a norm of prosocial 
behavior (e.g., by trusting). Vohs, Baumeister and Chin (2007) point out that one way people 
respond to having been played for a sucker is that they lie about it to others. Being a sucker is not 
just about the feeling of being treated unfairly; there is also a distinctly social component to the 
shame or humiliation. I want to argue that the norm against being a sucker (which I will call the 
“sucker norm”) explains some of the power of the threat of being duped, the aversiveness of the 
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experience of being suckered, and the retaliatory impulses in response to exploitation.  
 c. Sucker Norm in Social Dilemmas 
 As I have discussed, there are two primary motivations for lack of cooperation in social 
dilemmas. The first is a basic greed motive; defecting in a situation in which others cooperate 
provides the highest payoff at the lowest cost. The second motive is the one we are interested in 
here, and that is the desire not to be exploited by others in the group. And, indeed, if when this 
motive is especially strong, it may appear as though people are greedier or more selfish than they 
actually want to be. In other words, people may have the impulse to cooperate but then choose 
defection out of fear of being a sucker.  
 In the context of a social dilemma, being exploited means allowing non-contributors or 
defectors to benefit from one's own high level of contribution. So, in a group project, group 
members who work long hours to finish the project might be exploited by another group member 
who slacks off but receives equal credit for the end product. In a social dilemma game, being 
exploited means contributing and allowing others who do not contribute to receive the same 
payoff without the cost of contribution. Kerr (1983) found that subjects reduce their effort in a 
group setting when the other member of the group attempts to free-ride. Interestingly, this is true 
only as long as the partner is capable of contribution. 
 In a basic social dilemma game, participants are endowed with a certain amount of money. 
They are permitted to contribute any amount to the group, with the understanding that the total 
contribution will be multiplied by some amount and then divided equally among the players 
(regardless of contributions). In this kind of game, everyone is better off by contributing the 
maximum amount as long as everyone follows this same rule. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that when groups play over multiple rounds, contributions decrease over time. In 
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some ways, this result is to be expected. After all, it is in each person's best interest to withhold 
contribution and receive the group payoff, e.g., to free ride. Thus, group members could 
reasonably expect others to try to free-ride, causing lower contributions. Even if group members 
are unsure whether to expect other players to defect, they are better off defecting when others 
cooperate than cooperating when others defect. There are many situations, like the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, in which the penalty for mistaken cooperation is high, and the reward for mistaken 
defection (in the PD, of course, there is actually a reward for unilateral defection, so defecting 
when you mistakenly expect your partner to defect is rewarded) is greater than the reward for 
mutual cooperation. In those cases, it is worse, in terms of actual payoffs, to be a sucker than it is 
to be selfish. Thus, the norm against being a sucker may actually provide a useful heuristic, in 
the sense that it is in line with the dominant response. 
 In some cases, however, fear of playing the sucker makes parties less likely to choose the 
wealth-maximizing strategy. In the Minimal Effort game, mistaken defection is not rewarded, 
but the results are the same (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The structure of a minimal-effort game is 
as follows: each player contributes some amount of an initial endowment. Players' returns are 
determined by the lowest-contributing member (with decreasing payoffs as the lowest 
contribution decreases). However, although all players receive a lower payoff when the lowest 
contribution is low, those payoffs are also dependent on the contribution of the individual. Thus, 
the range of payoffs in a round is determined by the lowest contributor. Within that range, the 
lowest contributor actually receives the highest amount, and the highest contributor receives the 
lowest. In that game, mutual cooperation is better than mistaken defection. Cooperation means 
choosing the highest level of contribution (the level that also has the highest net payoff); to 
defect is to choose a lower level. In this game, no one benefits from defection in the first round. 
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A player who defects when others cooperate receives a lower payoff in that round than he would 
have had he contributed (unlike in an investment game). There is no good reason, in that game, 
to think that mistaken defection is better than mistaken cooperation, at least in the very early 
rounds. (It is true that the payoffs make the penalty for mistaken cooperation higher than the 
penalties for mistaken defection, but if the player cooperates, he also has a chance of getting the 
highest payoff from mutual cooperation.) And, in fact, the stronger the norm against being a 
sucker, the less likely the group is to get the payoffs of mutual cooperation. I think that what 
happens here is that players begin to focus on the comparative payoffs rather than the absolute 
payoffs. Fear of getting less than others (thus being a sucker) becomes focal, rather than the 
desire to get the maximum possible. 
 How does the norm of self-interest matter in a social dilemma? Researchers have found 
that the salience of a group norm of cooperation or self-interest affects players' contributions. 
Mulder et al. (2005a) found that when the group was made aware of a norm of non-cooperation, 
players were less likely to cooperate. Participants were shown bogus comments from other 
players indicating that the other players intended to make self-interested decisions. This case 
provides an interesting example of how the norm of self-interest might affect rational 
calculations. In a social dilemma game in which players learn of a group norm of self-interest, 
cooperation is futile. A social norm is one way of setting up expectations, and if a player expects 
others to defect, his best choice is also defection. 
 Indirect evidence suggests that the social norm is even more powerful than expectation-
setting, though. Numerous researchers have found that sanctioning systems in social dilemmas 
seem to change the nature of the game or the situation, instantiating a shift from a moral or 
interpersonal dilemma to an economic calculation. In most cases, of course, a sanction has the 
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expected effect of increasing cooperation (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Yamagishi, 1986). However, in 
at least two interesting cases, sanctions do not increase cooperation. 
 If players are exposed to a game with sanctions and then the sanctions are removed, the 
players who first saw the game with sanctions are less likely to cooperate than those who did not 
see the game with sanctions (Mulder, van Dijk, De Cremer & Wilke, 2005a). And, sanctions do 
not increase cooperation when players have an alternative option for defection (Mulder, van 
Dijk, De Cremer & Wilke, 2006). In these two cases, the sanctions do not directly affect the 
rational calculus of the target dilemma, so it is not so surprising that the sanctions fail to increase 
cooperation. What is potentially surprising is that the exposure to sanctions actually decreases 
cooperation as compared to a control group who played the game with no sanctions. The shift 
that so many researchers have observed when sanctions are introduced, from a moral dilemma to 
an economic calculation, may be partly explained by the power of the sanction to introduce a 
social norm. After all, if the norm of cooperation was strong enough, there would be no need for 
a sanction. 
 Even though it is in each individual's interest to defect in a prisoner's dilemma or an 
investment game, players are surely capable of reasoning that this kind of logic will usually lead 
to a third-best payoff--if everyone expects everyone else to defect, there is no reason to think that 
defection will yield the highest payoff. Thus, there is at least an argument that it is unclear what 
the norm of self-interest would dictate--cooperate and get the second-best payoff, or defect and 
almost certainly get a third-best payoff? This is where a norm of self-interest might be broadened 
to include the idea of the sucker norm. In many cases, it is unclear what, exactly, is in a person's 
self-interest. One way to think of the sucker norm is as a kind of heuristic for how to figure out 
what is in one's own best interest. The basic rule is to look at the people around you and try not 
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to end up with less than what they are getting. And it seems possible that this is often a useful 
rule--one way to figure out how much you should get is to look around and see what everyone 
else is getting, and to insist on an equitable outcome. In the context of a social dilemma, though, 
this might take the focus off how to achieve the highest payoff and turn it to a question of how to 
avoid receiving a lesser payoff.  
            If the dominant social norm prescribes self-interest, this should affect cooperation and 
other kinds of prosocial behavior. The desire not to be a sucker motivates people not to help in 
situations in which the cost of helping is low and the payoff is high. I would like to suggest that 
we might be able to explain the bystander effect via the non-sucker heuristic, and this is also a 
case in which I think it is non- normative. It is confusing, when we consider the bystander effect 
(Darley & Latane, 1968), that people would prefer to risk the least desirable outcome (someone 
is in need and no help is on they way) for fear of being unnecessarily unselfish. First, though, 
what does it mean to be a sucker in this context? We might think, here, about some of the 
original Darley & Latane experiments, in which subjects in a testing room heard someone 
outside fall off of a ladder. My suggestion is that the sucker is the one person among others who 
goes outside to look and finds out that nothing is wrong or that his help is for some other reason 
unwelcome (say, the injured person's wife is already there). 
 If the bystander is alone, there is no reason to compare his cost/payoff with anyone else's, 
so the non-sucker norm is not activated. But if he is with others, he does not want to be the one 
to risk being a sucker. I will assume here that there is a payoff, knowing the victim is being 
helped, and a cost, helping. Being a sucker means either helping and getting no payoff, because it 
turns out that nothing is wrong, or it means being the only bystander to help, such that the other 
bystanders get the payoff without helping. My contention is that in the bystander experiments, 
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people in groups do not help, even though the expected utility of helping may be positive for 
each person. And, in fact, people who did not help are likely to feel very guilty afterward. The 
sucker norm temporarily distorts preferences, making the comparative nature of the payoffs more 
salient than it should be given that the cost of helping remains very small and the potential 
payoff very large.  
III. Avoiding the Sucker Norm 
 I have just argued that part of the cognitive, emotional, and motivational power of being a 
sucker can be explained by a social norm that dictates against it. In this section, I will consider 
when this norm is invoked, and when it can be avoided. In many situations, people do accept a 
disadvantageous inequality. Anecdotally, this is obviously the case; we do not, after all, live in a 
socialist society. Here, I will review situations in which people are able to avoid invoking the 
norm against playing the sucker. My claim is that when the sucker norm would require forgoing 
a material benefit, people may be motivated to re-frame the situation in order to avoid the sucker 
norm and take the better payoff. 
 a. Avoiding the Sucker Norm by Justifying the Distribution 
            The first and most obvious point is that people are responsive to distributional rules and 
norms. This observation is closely tied to the notion of fairness that I proposed at the beginning: 
by deciding that a distribution is fair, the person with the lesser payoff can avoid the sucker 
norm. Distributional rules might also be thought of as social norms that provide heuristics for 
establishing whether or not a distribution is fair. For example, it is acceptable to me that my boss 
makes more money than I do; she has more responsibilities and more seniority. The rule of 
wages is that many factors affect individual pay levels, so those who make less money do not 
(usually) feel suckered by the higher wage earners. This principle also works in a controlled 
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game theoretical setting. In most ultimatum games, proposers offer at least 30% and usually 50% 
of the initial endowment, and responders reject offers lower than 30-40% (Kahneman, Knetsch 
& Thaler, 1986). However, Hoffman et al. (1994) demonstrated a manipulation in which 
proposers would offer less and responders would accept. In this game, participants learned that 
the roles, proposer and responder, would be allocated based on the results of an earlier auction in 
which one party had "earned" the right to be the proposer. When proposers are offered a small 
amount, they normally have only two choices: accept the small amount and play the sucker, or 
reject the small amount and get no money at all. But in this game, a third option becomes 
available: decide the small offer is justified (fair) such that the sucker norm does not apply and 
take the money. 
 In order for one person to be a sucker, someone else must be a free-rider. If there is good 
reason to think that the beneficiary party is not free-riding, there is no reason to fear being a 
sucker. This is important for questions of when the sucker norm is invoked. Thus, if I work in a 
company in which my boss has more experience and works longer hours than I do, the fact that 
she gets paid more than I do is not particularly galling. She is not free-riding, insofar as we have 
made some kind of determination that contributions by people like her deserve greater rewards. 
Even more interesting, perhaps, is that in order to be a true free-rider, there must be an element 
of agency or intentionality to the non-cooperation. In Kerr's (1983) studies of the sucker effect in 
group motivation, he found that subjects did not decrease their own effort in response to a 
partner who was performing poorly as long as there was indication that the partner's poor 
performance was the result of incapacity rather than laziness. This presents a more complicated 
case; in Kerr's studies, the underperforming partner is arguably still receiving a benefit (lower 
contribution, equal share of credit) than the potential sucker, but nonetheless the sucker norm 
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does not seem to change the subject's behavior. It is pointless, as a matter of deterrence, to try to 
punish someone who is incapable of changing his behavior. But the partner’s lack of skill may 
also be serve as a justification for the inequitable contributions, making it easier for the 
contributing partner to choose the higher-payoff outcome without feeling like a sucker.  
 b. Re-Framing to Avoid the Sucker Norm 
            There are many good justifications for accepting the idea of equitable distribution (in 
which resources are allocated according to various rules of fairness) rather than equal 
distribution. By instituting a distributional rule that favors those who contribute more (effort, 
money, etc.), for example, a society might encourage greater production. The subjects in a game 
like that described by Hoffman et al. may be justified in attributing the inequality to the results of 
a previous competition. In other situations, though, the difference between invoking the sucker 
norm and avoiding it is simply a matter of framing. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) 
showed subjects two possible scenarios. In one, a company decides to cut wages in response to a 
market slow-down. In another, the company decides not to raise wages to keep pace with 
inflation in response to a market slow-down. Subjects were asked how likely they would be to 
quit if they were working at this company. Those who read about the wage decrease were more 
likely to say they would quit than those who read the inflation scenario. In this case, the 
researchers explain their results as an effect of gain/loss framing; in one case, workers must 
accept a loss from the status quo, and in the other, they must forgo a gain.  
 c. Using Situational Ambiguity to Avoid Sucker Norm 
 Another explanation might be that the inflation scenario introduces some ambiguities into 
the dilemma. What are the norms for wages in times of rapid inflation? How, exactly, does 
inflation work? When there are economic incentives for avoiding the sucker norm, people may 
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ask themselves, "Must I believe this?" (Gilovich, 1991) in a case like this, subjects may reason 
that the scenario is confusing or ambiguous enough that they need not forgo the job in order to 
preserve their non-sucker status. In a more literal demonstration of the effect of ambiguity, Guth 
and Huck (1999) have shown another manipulation that seems to help avoid the sucker norm. In 
their ultimatum game, players were informed that there were two possible endowments that a 
proposer could receive, 38 or 16 units of money; responders would not learn a given proposer's 
endowment. In this game, the modal offer was 8, or half of the smaller amount. Responders 
accepted this amount, and were more likely to accept 8 than 9. As long as the endowment 
amount was plausibly ambiguous, responders would take the payoff rather than suspect the 
proposer. Once it was clear that the endowment was large, proposers could no longer pridefully 
accept an offer as low as 9—less than 25% of the endowment.  
 Bicchieri and colleagues (2007) have also found effects of ambiguity in the ultimatum 
game. In these experiments, ambiguity is introduced by way of a coin flip. In this game, both 
proposers and responders know that there are three possible offers: The proposer an offer an 
even split (five dollars for each player), an advantageous split (eight for the proposer, two for the 
responder), or a coin flip. In the coin-flip option, the proposer agrees to let the experimenter 
randomly determine which distribution (5,5 or 8,2) will apply. Though responders will routinely 
reject an 8,2 distribution if the proposer simply chooses that as his offer, they will accept it if it is 
the result of the coin flip. This is potentially a strange result. On the one hand, there seems to be 
an element of randomness in this case that could negate the human agency requirement for 
sucker effects; in the most immediate sense, it is the coin, not the proposer, who has determined 
the allocation. On the other hand, though, the proposer has chosen to put the responder at risk for 
a low payoff even though he could have just chosen the certain even split. The expected value of 
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the coin flip to the responder is only 3.5; this is surely low enough that many people would reject 
it if it were offered as a certain payoff. Therefore, they should rationally reject the coin flip. 
Now, it seems reasonable that people will eschew this logic if the coin flip yields an even split 
(since they do not have to actually accept a disadvantageous payoff in that case), but when the 
flip does not go their way, they are accepting a low, disadvantageous payoff from a human agent 
who has chosen to offer a disadvantageous payoff. 
 Blount (1995) simply re-framed the ultimatum game to look as if there was an added level 
of ambiguity about the human agency involved in generating the offers, and found that this 
framing increased subjects’ willingness to accept low offers. She elicited from potential 
responders the range of offers that they would be willing to accept. In one condition, they chose 
from among all possible offers, and very few subjects were willing to accept the smallest offer 
possible. In another condition, subjects saw the actual distribution of the offers of the proposers 
with whom they could be paired. Subjects were informed that their offer would be drawn 
randomly from the distribution. In this case, more subjects indicated that they would be willing 
to accept the smallest amount.  
 One reason that subjects may be able to accept a low offer in the case of a coin flip or a 
“randomly selected” offer from among a pool of offers is that these cases literally introduce 
some ambiguity into the offer. Who decided on this low offer, the proposer or the random draw? 
What were the proposer's intentions? Even more simply, the coin flip or the random draw may 
re-frame the immediate game as one of chance, allowing players to tell themselves that it is the 
coin, not the proposer, that has decided the distribution. As in every ultimatum game, there is a 
financial incentive for players to avoid the sucker norm; accepting the money and not feeling like 
a sucker (via avoiding the sucker norm) is a higher payoff than rejecting the money and not 
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feeling like a sucker (via retaliation). 
 d. Avoiding the Sucker Norm in Second-Order Dilemmas 
 The sucker norm may also help explain the differences in cooperation in first- and second-
order social dilemmas. As we have discussed, it is very difficult to maintain cooperation in social 
dilemmas, especially when sanctions are absent or inadequate. However, even when people do 
not choose to voluntarily cooperate, they will often vote to in favor of mandatory cooperation. A 
social smoker may be unwilling to unilaterally refrain from smoking in bars but nonetheless be 
in favor of a city-wide ban on smoking in public places. Eichenberger & Oberholzer-Gee (1998) 
have shown that people will vote for a fairer division of payoffs than they will choose on their 
own.  
 This has been explained in various ways. First of all, there may simply be less cost or risk 
involved in voting for cooperation than there is in cooperating when cooperation is not externally 
enforced. In an investment game, it seems reasonable that many players would prefer that 
contribution be mandatory. Though mandatory contribution negates the possibility of free-riding 
and getting the highest possible payoff, players should intuit that, if they are tempted to under-
contribute, many of their cohort will be similarly motivated, in turn driving down the possible 
payoff. One way to frame this is that a second-order dilemma gives players a chance to choose 
the second-best payoff--all cooperate--in order to avoid the near-certainty of getting the third-
best payoff--all defect. Though they give up the chance of the best payoff (defect while others 
cooperate), they eliminate the risk of the worst payoff (cooperate while others defect). 
 In a first-order social dilemma, the sucker norm dictates that parties should protect 
themselves against exploitation, and this will almost always mean choosing the short-sightedly 
self-interested option (say, defection in a Prisoner’s Dilemma). In a second-order dilemma, 
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though, players can choose the option that will, in fact, have the best outcome for the group (e.g., 
all cooperate) without having to worry about reduced comparative payoffs. If people are greedy, 
they might choose defection in both cases, hoping to get lucky and have an exploitable partner. 
But if people are fearful of being a sucker, they should choose to defect in the first-order 
dilemma but to cooperate in the second-order dilemma, since cooperation in the second-order 
dilemma reduces the opportunity to be greedy but does not reduce the player’s own comparative 
payoff. 
 Samuelson, Messick, Rutte & Wilke (1984) had subjects play a sort of tragedy of the 
commons game. In this game, each subject saw a screen showing a pool of resources. In a given 
round, each subject could take up to 30 units, and at the end of the round the pool would be 
replenished at a variable rate, but usually around 30 units total. Subjects were told to both try to 
get as many units for themselves as possible and to try to keep the game going (e.g., to keep 
some resources in the pool) for as long as possible. Subjects saw a screen showing how much 
each player was removing (in fact, the screen was controlled by the experimenter). In this game, 
subjects were more likely to endorse a leader who would enforce cooperative levels of resource-
removal when the group had quickly used up all the resources.  
 Another possibility is a bandwagon effect, in which people are more cooperative when they 
expect others to be more cooperative (Tyran, 2004). People may be willing to vote for mandatory 
cooperation even in situations in which they would not choose to cooperate because in a world of 
mandatory cooperation, it is much more difficult to free-ride. In turn, when there are no free-
riders, there are no suckers. In some cases, this might permit subjects to express their true 
preferences for equity without having to risk being a sucker. In other cases, players may simply 
find that this is the best way to ensure the highest realistic payoff.  
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IV. Responding to Being Suckered  
 If most people find it aversive to play the sucker role, then it makes sense that people 
would be willing to impose sanctions on others who attempt exploitation. One traditional method 
of punishment might be achieved through litigation or even criminal prosecution in cases of 
fraud. Or, in a more everyday sense, we might get angry with a free rider or try to shame him 
into cooperation. In these examples, we might think that the punisher, the potential sucker, is 
actually using the sanction or threat of sanction to change his or her own outcome. That is, if I 
feel I am being ripped off by my contractor, I sue him in order to get my money back. In this 
case, there is a direct relationship between my punishing behavior and my own payoff. 
Evolutionary accounts of this kind of behavior refer to direct reciprocity and reputation 
formation. For the purposes of this paper, this kind of response is pretty uncontroversial, and not 
very psychologically interesting, insofar as it is a rational wealth-maximizing approach to the 
situation. However, evidence exists to suggest that people punish exploiters or free riders even 
when punishment is costly, and, even more perplexing, even when punishment is arguably 
pointless in terms of the punisher's payoffs or the future behavior or the exploiter. 
 a. Altruistic Punishment of Exploiters 
 Fehr and Gachter (2002) introduced the notion of altruistic punishment by demonstrating 
that players in a one-shot social dilemma game were more likely to contribute at higher levels 
when the game allowed for sanctions of under-contributors. In this game, in the punishment 
condition, players made their contribution decisions simultaneously. After the contributions had 
been made and payoffs determined, subjects were informed of others' contributions and 
permitted to impose a fine on other players (the fine had a multiplier such that contributing one 
dollar for punishment yielded a three dollar fine on the defector). Fehr and Gachter argue that 
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this behavior cannot be explained by direct reciprocity or reputation effects. First of all, this 
punishment was costly. At the time that players made the decision to punish, they had already 
received the payoff from that round of play. Contributing part of that payoff in order to punish 
other players constituted a loss. And, because no players met one another twice, it was not 
possible for a punisher to directly influence his own payoff on the next round via a harsh 
punishment on the current round. Nonetheless, the introduction of a punishment mechanism into 
the game increased payoffs overall by encouraging cooperation. In this second-order sense, then, 
punishment yielded increased payoffs for the punishers, even though it decreased payoffs in the 
short-term. 
 However, as the name of the phenomenon suggests, it does not seem accurate to think of 
this punishment as purely wealth-maximizing behavior. A player who contributes his own 
money to punish in an early round runs the risk that the benefit of his action will be enjoyed by 
another group, while he might get stuck in a new group with a defector who went unpunished in 
an earlier round. Here, I think it is helpful to reframe the game in terms of the exploiter and the 
sucker. The exploiter is the free rider or the under-contributor. The sucker is any player who has 
more or less cooperated under the norms of the group or the game. The cooperator is a sucker 
because he has accepted a disadvantageous inequality: his payoffs are lower than the exploiter's 
payoffs because of their different respective contributions. At this point, the sucker has a choice: 
accept his lower payoff, or pay to even the score. If he pays to even the score--if he punishes--he 
gets an immediate benefit in the form of no longer playing the sucker. (There is, of course, the 
possibility of being a second-order sucker: if I am the only player to punish and all the other 
cooperators get to enjoy the benefits of my punishing without having to sacrifice any money 
themselves, then I am again in the position of paying more for a benefit everyone enjoys equally. 
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My sense is that most people do not experience this as aversive in the same way because they are 
focused on the inequality between themselves and the defector. This may also relate to my 
argument, below, that punishers are, almost by definition, not suckers.) Thus, a sucker can, by 
punishing, refuse to be exploited by, paradoxically, giving up even more of his payoff in order to 
ensure that a defector's payoff is lower than his own. My argument is that there are multiple 
factors potentially contributing to the decision to altruistically punish. First, is a potentially 
successful group strategy in the sense that it yields higher payoffs for all. Second, it may also 
offer individual rewards to the punisher in terms of redefining his role as a punisher rather than a 
sucker. 
 b. Punishing in order to Stop Feeling Like a Sucker 
 As I have hinted, I would like to argue that punishers are, descriptively speaking, not 
suckers. A sucker is someone who accepts a disadvantageous inequality, or someone who lies 
down and takes it. A punisher refuses to take the raw deal, even when it means an even worse 
outcome--no deal at all. Some of the best evidence for this might be research on pointless 
punishment. Pointless punishment describes cases in which the punishment cannot enrich the 
victim (in this case, the sucker), and either will not change the behavior of the exploiter, or will 
have a net negative effect on society as a whole. Baron and Ritov (1993) demonstrated people's 
willingness to impose punishment on tortfeasors irrespective of the secondary effects of that 
punishment in terms of its ability to deter wrongdoing or yield net benefits for society. Rather, it 
seemed that subjects' punishment responses were focused solely on the nature and extent of the 
misdeed. By reducing the payoffs of the exploiter--here, the tortfeasor, who has presumably 
enjoyed the benefit of his negligence without heretofore sharing the cost--subjects, as members 
of society, can reduce the risk or extent of exploitation. Of course, given that I have stipulated 
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that the punishment has no actual deterrent effects on the exploiter, this is true only in a narrow 
sense: the punisher, focusing on his relative payoffs to the exploiter, can reduce or eliminate the 
other's payoff, thus reducing the inequality, and the degree of exploitation. 
 Finally, I want to suggest that any punishment can play an important role in alleviating the 
discomfort of being a sucker. As I have discussed, most players in a given ultimatum game will 
reject an offer below 30 to 40 percent. Xiao and Houser (2005) recently suggested that one 
reason for this rejection is that it was the only response that would indicate dissatisfaction with 
the low offer. When they permitted responders to write a message to proposers, responders who 
received low offers were more likely to write an angry message and accept the offer than 
responders who did not have the option of writing a message. The authors framed their findings 
in terms of emotion expression, but I think a similar argument could be made for the note as a 
form of interpersonal sanction (however pointless). Or, at an even more basic level, when the 
responder is able to accept the offer but feel that he is not passively accepting a raw deal, he will 
do so. 
 d. Punishing Betrayals 
 There may be an important role here for a norm against being a sucker. Koehler and 
Gershoff (2003) asked two groups of subjects to assign punishments for five different crimes; in 
both cases, subjects were shown information about the professions of the respective perpetrators. 
In one condition, the perpetrators were randomly assigned to the crimes; in the other, each crime 
was committed by someone who would normally be entrusted to prevent just such an occurrence 
(e.g., a bank robbery committed by a security guard). Subjects were more punitive when the 
perpetrator was an otherwise trusted agent. This might be a good heuristic. As Sunstein (2005) 
points out, a betrayal causes not only the harm of the crime itself, but also a disruption to the 
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victim's propensity to be trusting in the future. However, Koehler and Gershoff also 
demonstrated betrayal aversion in cases in which it was arguably non-normative. In their studies, 
subjects preferred inferior products—products that were actually less safe—to superior products 
that had a small risk of betrayal (e.g., a car with no airbag and a higher risk of death in a collision 
vs. a car with a lower overall risk of death but with an air bag that causes death or injury in a 
small number of cases). 
 Shinada, Yamagishi and Ohmura (2004) have shown a similar effect in an investment 
game. They find that cooperative players are more punitive toward non-cooperative in-group 
members than they are toward non-cooperative out-group members. This study suggests one 
basic function of trust for the sucker heuristic: trust frames the relevant comparison group and 
makes it especially salient. In order to be a sucker, a person must accept a disadvantageous 
inequality of some kind. If someone steals my wallet, I am aggrieved and angry, and it may even 
make sense to think of me as receiving the lower payoff as between myself and the thief. But if 
my babysitter steals my wallet, I am now part of a dyad in which I have cooperated and my 
partner has defected, and it seems clear that I am playing the sucker role in this relationship.  
V. Sucker Norm: Policy Implications and Directions for Future Research  
 a. Social Welfare Policy 
 People are highly attuned to issues of distributive justice, or, in the case of welfare policy, 
redistributive justice. For this reason, there are a number of cases in which a majority of people 
choose a costly, inefficient solution over a lower-cost solution that appears to distribute the 
burdens unevenly over a population. One example from a recent New Yorker article (Gladwell, 
2006) is the case of the alcoholic, chronically homeless population in many American cities. The 
chronically homeless cost the government enormous amounts of money in emergency health 
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care. It costs much, much less to simply provide them with housing up front, thus preventing the 
kinds of medical complications that arise from living outside. Nonetheless, many people are 
reluctant to adopt a policy that pays for unemployed addicts to get free housing. One possibility 
is that this kind of situation raises the specter that the rest of the hard-working population will be 
taken for suckers, while the homeless addicts are permitted to free-ride. In this case, it may be 
that people are not simply greedy and not simply showing a preference for fairness, but rather 
that they fear being taken advantage of.  
b. Victims of Sucker Crimes 
 A social norm against being a sucker may inhibit a society’s ability to deal with certain 
kinds of crimes, particularly crimes against suckers. I would include in this category any kind of 
crime that requires an initial act of trust by the eventual victim; fraud and date rape are two that 
come easily to mind. Victims of these kinds of crimes have violated a norm by playing the 
sucker. This violation may make it easier to blame the victims or to assume that they consented 
to some portion of the harm, even in cases in which the victim’s trust for the perpetrator was not 
unwarranted or in cases in which the trust is irrelevant to the definition of the crime.  
 The sucker norm may also inhibit the reporting of these kinds of crimes. Reporting that one 
has been a victim of fraud means telling other people that you were a sucker. On top of whatever 
self-blame might play a role here, revealing to other people that one has violated a shared norm 
is an added harm that victims may choose to avoid. 
c. Sucker Norm and Violence 
 The United States has a very high rate of gun crimes, but many people remain opposed to 
gun control legislation. One traditional justification for keeping weapons unregulated is that 
regulations will decrease the ability of law-abiding citizens to access the kinds weapons that 
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criminals are able to procure illegally. Part of the issue is surely greed; some people like guns 
and want to be allowed to keep them. But fear of being a sucker may also keep people from 
supporting these kinds of laws. Even though we can be fairly sure that strong gun laws will 
reduce the overall incidence of gun violence, people seem to be fearful of upsetting the balance 
of power in favor of criminals, some of society’s free-riders. This fear is admittedly different 
than the fear of being a sucker in a social dilemma game, but nonetheless parallel: fear of being 
at a disadvantage seems to push people to choose the worse outcome (more people with guns) 
even given the chance of a better outcome (fewer people with guns).  
 Support for this notion might be drawn from Nisbett and Cohen’s (1994) discussion of a 
culture of honor in the southern U.S. states. Nisbett and Cohen cite evidence that southerners 
adhere to a strict social norm of protecting honor, which means protecting oneself, one’s family, 
and one’s property from harm—including the harm of insult. The authors argue that this culture 
explains the high rates of violence in the South, as well as the endorsement of violence. 
Southerners are more likely to own guns, be against gun laws, and believe that victims, potential 
victims, and law enforcement agents should be able to retaliate with gun violence in a broad 
range of situations. I would argue that there are strong parallels between the notion of the sucker 
norm and the culture of honor. When this kind of social norm is particularly salient, people may 
be willing to sacrifice social utility (in the form of less violence overall) in order to preserve the 
individual’s ability to respond to exploitation or insult.   
d. Gender Differences 
 It is quite reasonable to expect that there are individual differences in how responsive 
people are to the sucker norm. One difference that may be especially interesting is the difference 
between men and women. In Kerr’s (1983) studies of the sucker effect in social loafing 
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experiments, he found much less evidence of fear of being a sucker in his female subjects. In his 
studies, he paired subjects with a partner who was failing to contribute to a group task either 
because the partner was lazy or incapable. For men, this distinction was important, and male 
subjects responded to the lazy partner by exerting very little effort themselves, though they 
worked quite hard when their undercontributing partner was apparently not capable of 
succeeding at the task. For women, on the other hand, the difference between these conditions 
was not significant—even though women were as likely as men to show a decrement in effort 
(free-ride) when paired with a hard-working partner. Eckel and Grossman (2001) have also 
found that women are less likely than men to altruistically punish. If, indeed, there are gender 
differences in the sucker norm, it may be that the sucker norm is more salient for men because it 
is affirms typically male traits like dominance and agency (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). It could 
also be the case that women are equally responsive to the norm but simply have a higher 
threshold for perceiving unfairness—women may be more acclimated than men to receiving a 
smaller portion of the pie. Future research might investigate the nature and mechanisms of 
gender differences in this area.   
V. Pilot Study 
 In light of these ideas, I conducted a small preliminary study to see if I could influence 
subjects’ responses to a standard experimental task like the Ultimatum game. I predicted that 
subjects who were more worried about being a sucker would be less likely to accept a 
disadvantageously inequitable division of goods. In order to prime subjects with the fear of being 
a sucker, I asked the experimental group to read a story about a guy who gets duped in front of 
his friends. I was concerned that I might see some differences between the control and 
experimental group that were based on the fear of being a victim in general, not just a sucker. In 
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order to avoid this, I had the control group read a story about a man whose wallet is stolen, even 
though he took reasonable measures to secure it. My hypothesis was that a reminder of the 
sucker norm would push subjects to be more wary of inequity in tasks like the Ultimatum game. 
a. Method 
83 subjects responded to a web-based questionnaire. All subjects read a story about a crime or 
fraud, and then answered questions about how they would behave in a hypothetical ultimatum 
game. We used a 2 x 2 design, manipulating the prime as well as the order of tasks. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to the sucker prime condition or the control condition. 40 subjects read a 
story about a sucker: 
"Jason and his friends were walking along the street when they were approached by a 
young man who introduced himself as Tyler. Tyler apologized for stopping them, but told 
them he needed help to get back to his car. His car had been towed the night before, and 
in it were his wallet and phone. The towing yard was across town, and the taxi would cost 
$10. Jason's friends looked skeptical, but Jason felt sorry for Tyler. Jason gave Tyler $10. 
Tyler thanked him and they parted ways. Two hours later, Jason and his friends were 
sitting in a coffeeshop when they saw Tyler again. They could see Tyler outside, 
obviously telling a young woman on the street an identical story to the one he had told 
Jason. Jason realized he had been swindled, but before he could get out to confront Tyler, 
Tyler had disappeared." 
 
I asked these subjects to answer four yes/no questions, including whether they thought Jason 
would feel embarrassed and whether he would feel like a sucker. 
43 subjects read a control story, in which Jason is the victim of a crime and loses $10, but is not 
a sucker. 
"Jason went to his gym to run on the treadmill. He put his clothes in a locker and locked 
it with a padlock. When he came back, he saw that the locker room had been robbed. 
Someone had used bolt cutters to snip the padlocks off of a whole row of lockers. Jason's 
wallet was still in the locker, but the contents were dumped out, and the $10 he had in 
cash was gone. Nothing else had been stolen." 
 
Subjects who saw this story answered four follow-up yes/no questions, including whether Jason 
was the victim of bad luck and whether he would feel embarrassed.  
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 Subjects were also divided into two groups based on the order of tasks. We asked 
subjects to consider two hypothetical games: an Ultimatum game and a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 36 
subjects answered the Ultimatum game questions directly after seeing the prime, and then did the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. 47 subjects answered the Prisoner’s Dilemma first, then the Ultimatum 
game.  
 For the Ultimatum game task, subjects read a description of a task we called "The Offer 
Game." It was explained that one player was the Proposer, and that the Proposer was given ten 
one-dollar bills and told to make an offer to the Responder. If the Responder accepts, both would 
keep their allotment. If the Responder rejects, neither keeps any money. I asked subjects to 
imagine that they had been assigned the role of Responder in an Ultimatum game, and that the 
Proposer had offered $2. I then asked subjects if they would accept or reject this offer, and also 
to indicate the lowest offer that they would accept. 
 In the Prisoner’s Dilemma task, subjects read a description of a standard prisoner’s 
dilemma, and then indicated, on a scale from 1 (definitely defect) to 4 (definitely cooperate), 
how likely they would be to cooperate or defect, given no knowledge of the other player’s 
choice. 
b. Results 
 Our results suggest that there is an effect of the sucker prime, but that the effect is subtle 
and short-lived. Subjects who completed the Ultimatum game questionnaire directly after the 
sucker prime required a higher offer than subjects who read the control scenario. Most subjects 
answered that they would reject the $2 offer, and there were no significant differences between 
the sucker group and the control group for this question. However, the sucker group demanded 
an average offer of $3.94 in order to ensure acceptance, whereas the average willingness-to-
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accept figure for the control group was $2.44 (t=2.443, df=33.148, p=.0201). For subjects who 
saw the Ultimatum game question last, there was no significant difference between the sucker 
group and the control group (t=-1.150, df=44.823, p=.256).1 
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma task yielded no significant results. For subjects who completed 
the task immediately after the prime, the trend was in the predicted direction (the sucker group 
being more likely to defect), but it was not significant (t=.775, df=40.465, p=.4429). The 
difference was even smaller in the group who competed the task last. 
c. Discussion 
 The main result of this study is that subjects primed with a story about the humiliation of 
being a sucker are more likely to demand equity in an ultimatum game than those who are 
primed with a story about being a victim. The effect of the sucker prime seems to be fairly 
subtle, but it is robust enough that we got similar, significant results when we ran a replication 
study. Interestingly, we also replicated the effect of timing, finding again that an intervening task 
erased the effect of the prime on the Ultimatum game. This data is only suggestive, I think, but I 
hope it will help to motivate further studies with more sensitive dependent measures, including 
experimental games using real money and real-time player interaction.  
VII. Conclusion 
 I have argued that being a sucker is not only aversive because of the material loss and the 
aversive feeling of self-blame, but also because it violates a social norm. The sucker norm 
probably reinforces some useful heuristics—don’t accept less than you deserve, punish free-
riders, etc.—but it also serves to re-frame some situations such that the focus turns from the 
overall utility of a choice to the narrower question of comparative advantage. The sucker norm 
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will not explain every case of defection in social dilemmas or retaliation in experimental games, 
but it may nonetheless offer some explanatory power for the results reviewed here.  
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